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Summary
Management of digital identities in current systems is an increasingly important tool to achieve
integration and increase efficiency. It is even more essential in pervasive networks. This the-
sis presents the results in the analysis and design of a conceptual model for management of
identities and their inter-relationships for a pervasive computing platform in a future all-IPv6
integrated network. The relevant characteristics of these networks, and the challenges of a
multi-provider service-offer and composition architecture, are described. In particular, the se-
curity and privacy requirements of such an architecture are examined. A model of stakeholder
identities is then developed, showing how it meets privacy requirements, enables the manage-
ment of identities, and leverages them to make deploying and composing services in such net-
works easier. Special consideration is given to federated architectures. We balance the need to
limit access to private user information, with the conflicting need to have such information to
enable personalized service delivery. The model’s usage is described in the context of a flex-
ible authentication and authorization framework. The framework’s use and implmentation in
order to achieve privacy is described. We conclude with a discussion of related efforts, and their
comparison with our framework.
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Two phenomena emerging lately have changed the lives of millions of people and affected the
way people, organizations and governments conduct their work. They are, respectively, mobile
telephony, and the Internet. The effect of the former has been, largely, that people expect to be
able to communicate anywhere, anytime. The effect of the latter has been to enable people to
access a vast amount of information at the click of a button.
Interaction between different network types is becoming quite common. The POTS net-
work, the cellular network, and the Internet now are connected to each other, with information
flowing both ways between them. The Internet—a network of networks—has itself always been
heterogenous. From the end user’s point of view, technologies like WiFi, 100Mbit and Gigabit
Ethernet, and GPRS are jostling side-by-side as candidate access technologies, and offering a
variety of choices in terms of cost, ubiquity, and bandwidth.
These developments have given rise to a vision of a global converged network, offering users
pervasive services that combine various kinds of network connectivity, over several modalities:
voice and text messaging; email and instant messaging; real time location and presence infor-
mation; and, web based services.
1.1 Background: FP6 and Daidalos
The research work described in this thesis was undertaken as a part of a project, Daidalos,
funded partially by the European Commission under the Sixth European Framework Programme
for Research and Technological Development (FP6). FP6 provides funding of more than e
17 billion for various activities, including projects and testbeds, during 2002–2006 in order
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to promote research activities and strengthen the scientific and technological bases of industry
and encourage its international competitiveness. About e 12 billion are devoted to research
projects, which are organized into various Thematic Areas. One such area is the Information
Society Technologies (IST) “priority”.1
Daidalos (IST-2002-506997) is an Integrated Project funded under the IST priority within
FP6. The projected budget of Daidalos amounts to e 25.7 million, out of which e 14.7 million
are funded by the European Commission. Daidalos officially started on Nov 1, 2003 and has a
duration of 30 months. Forty-six partners from academia and industry participate in Daidalos.2
Daidalos is a very large project. We shall be unable to discuss the complete architecture of
Daidalos, and in this thesis shall focus on mainly one aspect. However, our research problem
and focus area, as well as the specific solutions sought, to a great extent, are motivated and
influenced by the totality of the project’s goals. Hence it will be appropriate to have a brief look
at Daidalos’s objectives and vision.
Motivation. Mobility has become a central aspect of the lives of European citi-
zens - in business, education, and leisure. Due to rapid technological and societal
changes, there has been a bewildering proliferation of technologies and services
for mobile users. This has created a complex and confusing communications en-
vironment for both users and network operators. Further development of existing
technologies, and the addition of new ones in Beyond 3G (B3G) systems, will ne-
cessitate a rethinking of fundamental technological issues in order to create user-
centred and manageable communication infrastructures for the future.
Vision. The vision of Daidalos is of a world in which:
• Mobile users can enjoy a diverse range of personalized services - seamlessly
supported by the underlying technology and transparently provided through a
pervasive interface;
• Mobility has been fully established through open, scalable and seamless inte-
gration of a complementary range of heterogeneous network technologies;
• Network and service operators are able to develop new business activities and
provide profitable services in such an integrated mobile world.
1The FP6 official website is at fp6.cordis.lu/fp6/home.cfm.
2The Daidalos official web-site is at www.ist-daidalos.org.
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Objectives. The objective of Daidalos is to develop and demonstrate an open ar-
chitecture based on a common network protocol (IPv6), that becomes a significant
step towards approaching the Daidalos vision. The overall Daidalos objectives are
to:
• Design, prototype and validate the necessary infrastructure and components
for efficient distribution of services over diverse network technologies beyond
3G;
• Integrate complementary network technologies to provide pervasive and user-
centred access to these services;
• Develop an optimized signalling system for communication and management
support in these networks;
• Demonstrate the results of the work through strong focus on user-centered and
scenario-based development of technology.
As can be seen above, Daidalos approaches the area of pervasive networking from two
different points-of-view: operators want to develop new business models and create innovative
services; and users’ want to have personalized, ubiquitous services.
In the next section we shall look deeper into Daidalos’s technical aspects.
1.2 A Pervasive Network Beyond 3G
Pervasive Applications and Middleware
Access Technologies
(DVB, UMTS, WLAN, Ethernet, Bluetooth, ... )
Uniform Transport Layer
Signaling and Management
(AAA, QoS, Mobility,Accounting, ...) 
Service Provisioning
(Session Migration, Content Adaptation, Key Management, ...)
Platform for Pervasive Applications
(Context Management, Rules and Policy engines, ...)
Figure 1.1: Daidalos Work Scope
Daidalos works to integrate heterogeneous access technologies to create a seamless all-IPv6
infrastructure [24]. Over this infrastructure, a platform for provisioning of services is deployed,
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containing necessary network management components and protocols. Utilizing this as a base,
a pervasive computing architecture is created, exposing an Application Programming Interface
(API) and framework over which pervasive, context-aware applications may be developed. This
is illustrated in Figure 1.1; the shaded blocks indicates work within the scope of Daidalos.
Daidalos does not create new access technologies, or (apart from proofs-of-concept) implement
applcations.
Daidalos proposes a canonical platform for service provisioning, including traditional com-
ponents such as:
• Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) [2] servers;
• QoS Brokers and related components;
• A Key Management system, such as a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
The platform also includes some non-traditional components, such as:
• A Policy Based Network Management System (PBNMS);
• Mobility Management support through Mobile-IPv6 Home Agent (HA)s;
• Multimedia signaling support infrastructure through Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).
On the user side, Daidalos proposes a end-user terminal software environment that will
enable seamlessly mobile, secure communication and access to services.
1.3 Research Overview
In this thesis, we shall examine how to provide security and privacy for pervasive services. As
an example of a pervasive service, imagine that you are viewing a news video on a home desktop
computer. Then you get up to leave for the airport, but you can continue to watch the news on
the way in the taxi, and while waiting in the air-port lounge because the news video has switched
seamlessy to your 3G and WiFi enabled PDA. Meanwhile, in the background, you are charged
by the airport the 3G service provider and the airport WiFi operator for streaming the news to
you.
This simple scenario raises several questions. How does the system know when you left
home or entered the airport? How does the system know that you would like to switch the video
6
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
to your handheld? How do the WiFi/3G operators know what video you were watching, and
how do they charge you?
1.3.1 Challenges in Pervasive Networks
As far as access to the Internet is concerned, there are a range of technologies available. The pri-
mary means are dial-up, Ethernet andWiFi. With the advent of 3G cellular systems, fast internet
access on mobile phones is becoming a reality, as well. However, the user is acutely aware of
the differences between these technologies. One may not, today, switch from using Ethernet to
WiFi without interrupting the operations of networked applications. The heterogenous nature of
the Internet, therefore, is painfully obvious.
Many initiatives, such as the project Moby Dick [10], have sought to integrate heterogeneous
networks into an all-IP infrastructure. Not only are multiple access technologies accessible using
IP or IPv6, it is possible to move network connections from one access technology to another
seamlessly without dropping (many) packets. In addition, security and QoS management are
added to the infrastructure, such that integrity and confidentiality of data, and service guarantees
for multimedia, can be assured.
Another trend is that services available over the Internet are proliferating, giving the user
a bewildering range of choices. A user typically “signs-up” with the provider of each service
he wishes to consume, creating an “account” at each provider. The number of “accounts” an
average user of the internet has is growing rapidly, making it more and more difficult for users
to cope with the management overhead. How may one reduce the exploding number of accounts
and simplify their management?
In our example of a pervasive service, above, you would like to be able to use the airport
WiFi service, with QoS guarantees (you are watching a video, and it should not be too jerky!)
without having to explicitly open an account with the service provider. To truly enjoy pervasive
services, users would need either automated ways to “sign-up” for a service on the fly without
much rigamarole, or be able to enjoy services without needing to have an account at all. Yet,
the WiFi service provider, and providers in general, would like to charge you for their service.
How may providers charge for services that may be discovered and used dynamically, perhaps
only once, without a prior business relationship with the consumer?
Such paid services can become popular only if the charges are affordable. Thus, micro-
payments—on the order of cents rather than dollars—will have to become possible. However,
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the system needed to enable micropayments is quite complex and burdensome and it is unlikely
that every new and small operator would invest in such a system. Micropayment solutions,
historically, have failed to take off simply because for an average merchant to process the mi-
cropayment imposes more cost than the payment itself. How may we offer providers an easy
way of deploying services and charge for them? How may we assure the user that a provider he
has had no contact with before is trustworthy—that the provider will charge him only so much
and not empty his bank account?
The true promise of pervasive services will be delivered when the user may compose novel
services from many small ones. In our example above, when you were watching the news video
on your PDA in the airport lounge, you could be combining the news video streaming service
with a content adaptation service. The latter scales down the video resolution to a level that is
useful for the PDA, saving you the bandwidth costs. How may be create services that can be
put together in different ways to create new and richer services? How can the provider of, say,
content adaptation services, negotiate with the provider of news videos on your behalf, to scale
the video?
These are some of the broad questions we have looked at during the course of the project,
and lead directly to our thesis statement:
Thesis statement: It is possible to use Identity Management as a basic building
block around which a comprehensive security and privacy architecture can be built
for pervasive systems; the architecture provides flexible services—such as authen-
tication and authorization—to a diverse set of clients, including but not limited to,
web services, and network authentication protocols.
1.3.2 Research Goals and Achievements
Addressing the problems mentioned in the previous section has been one of the fo-
cuses of the Daidalos project. The author has been responsible for the design and
specification of a Key Management framework for providing advanced security ser-
vices to other components in the project. The author was also personally involved
in the development of the Identity Model that serves to tie together disparate areas




In this thesis we shall not address the problems identified above in full general-
ity, but shall limit ourselves to questions of security and privacy, and shall briefly
touch on charging.
We have specified a terminology and a conceptual model, that we call the Iden-
tity Model, to discuss the above problems and possible solutions in what we believe
to be a coherent manner. We have built a security framework around this model.
We have designed a flexible authentication and authorization system that can solve
several of the problems mentioned in the last section and achive security and pri-
vacy goals. We have implemented prototype software to test and demonstrate our
design.
Our work builds heavily on identity management principles, and we draw in-
spiration from other identity management projects, such as Liberty Alliance [22],
Shibboleth [8], and Web Services Federation [5].
However, we believe our model is more general than these projects. The au-
thentication and authorization framework that we have designed are conceptually
very flexible. By building on the model, our authorization framework can treat dif-
ferent kinds of services in a uniform manner. In fact, even basic network access can
be treated like any other service (albeit, it has to be the first service to be accessed).
In Chapter 2 we shall take a look at these projects and compare their goals to our
own.
We believe that our model could be applied to situations other than the one
we have envisaged: it could be useful, perhaps, for analyzing any collection of
heterogeneous networks where users interact with multiple providers to consume
personalized services.
We defend our claims by giving representative scenarios and describing how
the model applies, rather than quantitative measurements. First, it is not clear what
measurements would be valid and useful, and secondly, the measured values would
depend heavily on the implementation of software and protocols.
We have published some results described in this thesis as [26] and [30] in the
IST Mobile Summit 2005. The papers were invited for poster sessions.
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Related Work and Comparison
Identity management is a growing concern in many industries, including solution
vendors and service providers. This has led to some initiatives to define a standard
for identity management. The most prominent ones are the WS-Federation [5] suite
of specifications, and the ones from the Liberty Alliance [22]1 group.
2.1 Web-Services Federation and Liberty Alliance
WS-Federation is a part of the WS-* [29] initiative led by IBM and Microsoft. This
standard bases its functionalities in other WS specifications to support a Federated
Identity. Policy and privacy issues are tackled by the WS-Policy and WS-Privacy
specifications.
Liberty Alliance (LA) is a consortium of over 150 companies that aim to pro-
duce standards to allow identity federation. Privacy is also one of the major con-
cerns of LA. A comparison stufy [23] from LA compares the two approaches with
some technical details. Although it is a little outdated due to recent changes in WS-
*, it is a good source for the interested reader. Despite having some differences on
technical details these two groups have similar conceptual models for the identity
and its federation. So we describe them here jointly, pointing the differences.
In both models identities are only attributed to users. Users can possess several
identities, that may (by user choice) be federated. The objectives are to provide:
Single-Sign-On (SSO) and Single-Log-Out (SLO); information sharing between
1The specifications can be seen at http://www.projectliberty.org/resources/specifications.php.
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organizations; access to attributes from identities (to provide ease-of-use to cus-
tomers); and anonymous yet authorized access to resources. Both use pseudonyms
to prevent correlation of identities by the service providers. A pseudonym relates to
an identity and is specific to a service provider. They define a special entity that is
responsible for validating the identities and keeping track of their relationships: the
Identity Provider (IdP). The IdP must certify that a user presents the correct creden-
tials for a given identity, and knows the other identities to which this one is related
to. It will then issue tokens to allow service providers to ascertain the identity that
pertains to them, along with its current authentication/authorization status. These
tokens are the pseudonyms that the IdP relates to the correct identity for the service.
When a specific identity is not required by the service, the IdP can just vouch for
the authentication of the federated identity, providing anonymous access.
It will be easily perceived that our federation approach draws some ideas from
these models. However, our focus extends to some different scenarios related to
accounting and charging issues (as described in 1.3.1). Our basic identity model
is more complex as it tries to cope with different requirements (again, business
concepts related to accounting) than those of these groups. We also introduce the
VID concept as a new layer to add to user experience and privacy.
2.2 Shibboleth
Shibboleth [8]2 is another federated administration that is being developed by Inter-
net2 andMACE. Basically, the aim is to leave identity management in the user’s ori-
gin site. That means that users do not have accounts in foreign sites, which rely on
the user’s home site (where he/she has an account) to provide the user’s attributes to
make authorization decisions. With Shibboleth, each site only administers its users
and authorizes access based on the attributes (usually group-membership, such as
“CS-Teacher@some-university.edu”) that a user’s home site provides. The user
can control which attributes can be shared with each foreign site. Pure attributes
based authorization makes some site personalization impossible but does provide
privacy by default. Again the identity model basics are simpler than ours, given that
2An older draft [7] describes the architecture better, in our opinion.
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business aspects are absent and privacy is dealt with controlled attribute release.
2.3 Other Perspectives
2.3.1 The Open Group Identity Management
The Open Group has produced a whitepaper [28] describing concepts, steps, tech-
nologies, rules of best practice for identity management. The document is a thor-
ough description of the current issues related to identity management, providing
guidelines and pointing current dangers for its deployment. It has some proposals
on identity management issues3, but maintains the conceptual identity model of the
current specifications.
2.3.2 The PingIdentity Model
The PingIdentity model [9] addresses the concept of identity in layers, too. In
this model, layer 4 identities are called “inferred identities” and are abstracted from
attributes of underlying layers; examples would be “blue-eyes citizens” and “drivers
from Utah”.
We consider them (a) application specific abstractions, requiring no more sup-
port from the underlying system than to expose the relevant attributes; and (b) not
under the user’s control and not addressing privacy and security issues.
2.4 Comparison
A summary of the identity management projects discussed above, and differences
from our goals, is presented in Table 2.1.
2.5 Limitations of Current Frameworks
2.5.1 Web-Centrism
The Identity Frameworks described above all suffer from the same problem: they
are too web-centric. Of these, the WS-Federation specifications are the most flexi-
3A proposal for a unique identifier for identities is one good example.
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Aspect WS-Federation Liberty Alliance Shibboleth




Available Available No, Only at Home
Domain























Driver Microsoft, IBM and
BEA
Consortium Internet2 and MACE
Table 2.1: Identity Management Frameworks
ble: they use technologies like HTTP and SOAP, but otherwise they can be used by
other applications. Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance both assume the client applica-
tion is a browser; their signaling protocol uses HTTP mechanisms and takes a lot
of roundtrips.
2.5.2 Openness
The Liberty Alliance specifications are the most complete, and a significant number
of products implementing these specifications are available. However, the copyright
of the specifications says:
“. . . certain elements of this Specification may require licenses under
third party intellectual property rights, including without limitation, patent
rights.”
The identification of these elements is not the responsibility of the Liberty Al-
liance consortium. Also, derivative work is subject to licensing.
13
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2.5.3 Authentication Mechanisms
One may assume, in general, that domains that are to be federated in an identity
management system would likely have different authentication mechanisms. How-
ever, the standards above lack the flexibility to adopt new authentication mecha-
nisms, or do not make explicit provisions for it.
2.5.4 Consumers versus Subscribers
In Daidalos, we consider the possibility that a person consuming the services need
not be the one paying for the services. Two examples could be:
• A family may purchase multiple video-on-demand service accounts; but the
children only consume the services, and the head of the family pays for the
total consumption.
• A corporation may purchase internet connectivity and email service for all
its employees. The corporation pays for the service usage. Perhaps different
employees get mail-boxes of different sizes.
We would like to distinguish between these two different entities, and encom-
pass them as part of the model. The frameworks mentioned above do not have a
representation for the paying entity and in fact do not address billing and charging
aspects in any significant way.
2.5.5 Services and Providers
As we mentioned earlier, one of the features of a pervasive network platform would
be to allow providers and users to put together various existing services to create
new ones. This requires that providers be able to authenticate each other in some
way. In the current Internet, relationships between providers are established on
a peer-to-peer basis by long-term legal contracts and service-level agreements. In
particular, dynamic discovery and composition is not catered for. When the number
of providers grows large, they will start facing problems similar to the ones we
are attributing to the relationships between users and providrs. It is possible that
services may themselves need to be identified in some manner (though likely not in
the same way as users are).
14
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Some of the frameworks mentioned above support dynamic discovery of ser-
vices. For e.g., the WS-* specifications incorporate this using UDDI. However, we
believe that a more uniform treatment of identities may achieve this in an elegant
manner.
None of the identity frameworks we have described (and several others as well)




The architecture diagram in Figure 3.1 shows the various functional subsystems that
ought to be present in a Beyond-3G network. The diagram is a highly simplified
version of the Daidalos architecture. We remove all components that are not related
to AAA and Key Management. However, the representation of various kinds of
operator networks is faithful to the original.
3.1 Functional Subsystems
The various functional blocks could be operated by different business entities, or
the same entity. The architecture is meant to be policy-neutral.
In the former case, the different business entities would have an agreement be-
tween themselves to inter-operate. For example, one operator could be running an
Access Network (AN), while another could be operating a Service Provider Net-
work. There could be even yet another operator providing “just” content. They
would like to interoperate in order to sell services to users. In that case, the func-
tions in the various blocks would enable them to do so.
3.1.1 Terminals
The terminal is an “end-user” device. Common terminals can be laptops, PDAs,
desktop computers. Other computing devices may also be used. When the terminal
is “mobile”, i.e., portable, then we refer to it as MT. For our purposes, there is no
functional difference between the mobile and non-mobile terminal and we will use
16














































3rd Party Service Provider
Figure 3.1: Logical Architecture
the terms interchangeably.
The terminal can connect to multiple ANs and make use of services in the AN,
Service Provider Network, as well as from 3rd Party Service Providers.
The terminal contains functional blocks to authenticate to the network and ser-
vices, and to manage mobility. It will also have components for managing QoS, for
initiating and maintain multimedia sessions, and for monitoring/metering, but we
omit them for brevity. We shall discuss the components related to authentication
and authorization in greater detail below.
3.1.2 Access Networks
This is the wired or wireless network through which terminals get IP connectiv-
ity. A number of different technologies may be used, such as Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), etc.
An AN contains components important for managing network level operations, as
opposed to provisioning of services.
The AAA component takes care of authentication, authorization, and account-
ing. The authentication and authorization will typically be related to network access
and not services. It need not do the charging, which is delegated to a related Service
17
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Provider operating a Service Platform.
The Access Router (AR) is not a functional block but a physical node. The AR
is the first IP-level device that terminals see when connecting to the network. It is
important because network access control is enforced at this node. Security over
the “last hop” is also enabled by this node.
3.1.3 Service Provider Network
In this part, functional blocks related to provisiong of services are provided. We
show a few of them: the PKI component takes care of inter-domain trust man-
agement; the AAA and Charging component takes care of authentication, autho-
rization, accounting and charging for services. It may also take care of metering
and monitoring, or there may be a separate component for that. The Home Agent
components takes care os user mobility.
Other components like QoS Brokers, Multimedia Services Provisioning (for
e.g., a SIP server or proxy), and PBNMS would also exist here, but we omit them
for brevity.
3.1.4 Third Party Service Provider
Third Party Service Providers provide applications and content to the end-users.
They could be part of a Service Provider Network, or outside it. They can use the
facilities in a Service Provider Network to enable authentication, arrange QoS for
content, to charge the user, and to use network information like the location of the
user in order to enhance their services.
3.1.5 PKI Interconnection
PKI based key management architectures are designed to be highly scalable and se-
cure. As such, they are the preferred choice for providing key management between
domains. PKI interconnection can be based on three distinct PKI architectures.
Hierarchical Interconnection
In this architecture, interconnection between domains is made possible due to a root
Certificate Authority (CA) that must be trusted by all users in all federated domains.
18
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The advantages of this method are: (a) scalability – new domains are easily
added; (b) certification paths are easy to develop; (c) certification paths are short.
However, this kind of interconnection would normally not work when the do-
mains to be interconnected are managed by distinct administrations and have their
own PKI. The choice of a trusted third party managing the root CA would be a dif-
ficult one. Even when such a choice has been made, the new root CA would have
to become the trust anchor for all users in all domains, and everyone would have to
update their software to replace the old trust anchors with the root CA’s certificate.
Cross Certification, without Bridge
This mechanism for providing PKI interconnection does not require new entities to
be added to the existing PKI infrastructure. It assumes that a specific CA in each
domain (usually called the principal CA) be inter-connected with all other principal
CAs of other domains through bi-directional, peer-to-peer relationships.
The main advantage of this architecture is that PKI users do not need to trust
a new entity, but continue to rely on their respective CAs. Dispensing with a new
entitiy also is an advantage in itself.
However, scalability issues arise very quickly with rising number of domains.
Another disadvantage is that certification paths are not easy to build, and may even
lead to infinite loops, due to the complex topology of the resulting architecture.
Cross Certification, with Bridge
In this method, all principal CAs in all domains establish a single peer-to-peer
trust relationship with a new CA called the Bridge CA. The Bridge does not issue
certificates to users, and the users continue to rely on their respective CAs. It is
also more scalable that the approach without a Bridge. The only disadvantage is
the creation of this new entity.
3.2 Roaming
Figure 3.2 shows a typical roaming scenario. The dashed lines show network level
authentication/authorization flows. The solid lines show service level authentica-
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3rd Party Service Provider
Figure 3.2: Simple Roaming Example
tion/authorization flows.
First, we assume that each MT is equipped with a set of credentials correspond-
ing to the user of the terminal. The credentials could be a user-id and password
pair, a digital certificate, or a One-Time-Password generating device.
The credentials are “issued” to the user by a service provider or operator, com-
monly called the Home Provider. It is the Home Provider that stores the informa-
tion necessary to authenticate the user in its AAA servers and has the ability to
authenticate the user. Commonly it is also the one that can determine the user’s
authorization to use various services, but other models are possible.
3.2.1 Network Access Control
Assume that at a certain point of time, a user’s MT was getting internet access
through AN 1. To get basic network access, the MT would have to authenticate to
AN 1. The line A.1 shows which components would be involved in such a flow.
The authenticating process on the MT would converse with a peer on the AR. The
peer would likely not do the authentication itself, but forward requests to its local
AAA server, and return responses from the AAA server to the MT.
20
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The local AAA may or may not be the user’s Home Provider. If it is, then it can
immediately perform an authentication and return the result—Success or Failure—
to the AR and MT.
In Figure 3.2 AN 1 is shown not to belong to the user’s Home Provider. Such
a network is commonly called a Visited Network or Foriegn Network. In this case,
the AAA server of the Visited Network would determine the user’s Home Provider
from the authentication request.
If the Visited Network and Home Provider do not have a roaming agreement,
then the user’s authentiation request must be rejected. Assuming they do, the Vis-
ited Network’s AAA server would forward the authentication request to the Home
Provider’s AAA server (over a secure channel). The Home Provider’s AAA server
would authenticate the user and return the authentication response to the Visited
Network’s AAA server, which would forward the response to its AR , and thence
to the MT.
Figure 3.2 shows that the MT moved from AN 1 to AN 2. Assuming these two
networks belong to two different administrative domains, the procedure outlined
above must be repeated for the MT to get network access in AN 2.
3.2.2 Service Access Control
Similar to network authentication, lines S.1 and S.2 show the flow of messages for
authentication and authorization for accessing a service (e.g., access to a secure
web-site). Note that typically the Visited Networks’ AR and AAA server are not
involved in the decision-making and do not intercept the messages related to service
authentication and authorization.
The application on MT requiring access to a service hosted on an Application
Server operated by the Third Party Serivce Provider (TPSP) would connect directly
to it and present authentication information. The Application Server would con-
tact its local AAA server to authenticate the user. The local AAA server would
determine the user’s Home Provider, and contact it to authenticate the user.
Authorization information (as opposed to authentication information) could be
sent in the same flow from the MT to the Application Server. Alternatively, the MT
may not send any authorization information; such information could be determined
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by the TPSP’s AAA server, the Home Provider’s AAA server, or a combination
of both. It may even be the case that no explicit authorization takes place, since
correct authentication implies authorization.
3.2.3 Authentication Mechanisms
It is clear that the credentials for network authentication and service authentication
need not be the same. In fact, it is quite possible that for network authentication and
service authentication the MT may be authenticating to different Home Providers
(although this situation is not shown in the figure). This imposes on the user the
burden of maintaining several sets of credentials. The alternative—always having




During the course of designing a KeyManagement and Authentication-Authorization
framework for a B3G system a model for representing the various stakeholders in
the system is useful. These entities would be directly or indirectly using the frame-
work, and it is important to identify them, and the relationships between them, as a
pre-requisite to capturing their interests in the system.
4.1 Requirements Identification
Characteristics of the network for which the Key Management and Authentication-
Authorization framework is being designed necessarily have some impact on the
specification of the model we have set out to develop. Three ways in which the
network characteristics affect our model are:
4.1.1 Security
Many pervasive computing initiatives make an implicit assumption that both the
source and consumer of context information are under the control of the same au-
thority, and therefore may trust each other.
In a multi-provider architecture, where a user’s private information resides in
one administrative domain and is consumed in some other domain, it is not pos-
sible to make this assumption. One must consider how trust relationships may be
established between providers, and how secure channels set up between providers
for the flow of sensitive information.
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Also, it is the user who should dictate what private information may a provider
disclose to other entities. In practice, there are a lot of such decisions, and without
the use of some intelligent agents to make such decisions for the user, the user
would be quickly overwhelmed.
In order to enable the “privacy agents” to do their work—which involves not
only releasing private information in appropriate situations, but also to withhold
private information from untrusted requestors—the security framework must pro-
vide the agents the tools needed to enforce their decisions. At the minimum, the
security framework needs to identity unambigusouly the requestor of information.
4.1.2 Privacy
Researchers in pervasive computing platforms do address the issue of user privacy
even when they are dealing with a single administrative domein. In some cases,
they also consider the possibility of anonymity of the user in a pervasive computing
environment. In [31] the authors make a case for privacy enhancing services in
ubiquitous computing, and mention some possible services. In [21], six principles
of security and privacy in pervasive computing are laid down.
According to [21], the goal of privacy in a pervasivce computing system ought
not to be a total clampdown on information. To quote:
What we can and will be able to achieve is prevent unwanted accidents—
data spills of highly personal information that people who have never
asked for it suddenly find at their doorstep. What we can do is allow
people who want to respect our privacy to behave in such a way, so that
we will eventually be able to build a long lasting relationship based on
mutual trust and respect. And what should also be within our reach is
achieving a good balance of convenience and control when interacting
with ubiquitous, invisible devices and infrastructures.
The principles of privacy are:
• Notice. Most legal systems require that data collection systems be open about
the fact that such data is being collected. It is the right of a person whose
data is being collected to know that information about him has been collected,
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and in most cases he is able to examine the data and protest against inaccura-
cies. Pervasive computing platforms, which would make heavy use of sensors,
should be open in the same sense, especially when the sensors collect data that
identifies a person uniquely as opposed to a generic detection.
• Choice and Consent. Some legal systems not only require data collectors to
give notice about their data collection practices, but also to obtain explicit
consent from the data subject.
• Anonymity and Pseudonymity. Some applications require no personal infor-
mation about the user and it becomes feasible to hide such information. For
example, a surfer on the WWW may go through an anonymizing proxy and
visit web sites without letting the web server know his IP address. On the other
hand, in a pervasive computing environment most applications would be tai-
lored to the user and would need some way of tracking the user. Pseudonymity
is a good substitute for anonymity in most such cases. It is not necessary for
the application to know exactly who you are—it just wants to know what your
preferences are. A pseudonym would serve just as well as your real name for
the purpose of identifying yourself to the application.
• Proximity and Locality. Location information is a side-channel, so to speak,
that applications could use to track you even if you were anonymous or pseudony-
mous. The granularity of such information should be revealed in a controlled
manner to external applications. There should also be limit in time and space
to how far the information is disseminated. Prescence information collected
within a building for applications within the building should not be revealed
to applications outside the building, and this information should be deleted
when you have left the building, to prevent abuse.
• Adequate Security. Security mechanisms which run fine on desktop com-
puters may be too comlpex for sensors and small devices that help us build
pervasive networks. It is false to believe that pure cryptographic protection of
data like sensor readings would be enough to protect one’s privacy, since the
sensor’s security mechanisms cannot comptete with a well heeled attacker’s
attack capabilities. Thus, instead of overwhelming users with a bunch of se-
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curity mechanisms, the principle of adequate security should be followed.
Sensor data should simply not be transmitted to remote locations. The other
principles mentioned above should be applied to limit the damage that an
attacker could do and make it unrewarding to attack the weak links in the
security chain.
• Access and Recourse. Trusting a system, and especially a system as far reach-
ing as a ubiquitous one, requires a set of regulations that separate acceptable
from unacceptable behavior, together with a reasonable mechanism for detect-
ing violations and enforcing the penalties set forth in the rules. Both topics
belong more into the realm of legal practice. Technology can help in imple-
menting specific legal requirements such as use limitation, access, or repudi-
ation. Augmenting a P3P-like protocol with something like digital signatures
would allow for non-repudiation mechanisms, where parties could actually
prove that a certain communication took place in case of a dispute. Database
technology could provide data collectors with privacy-aware storage technol-
ogy that would keep data and its associated usage practices as a single unit,
simplifying the process of using the collected data in full compliance with the
declared privacy practices. Sophisticated XML linking technology could en-
able the data subject direct access to his or her recorded information in order
to enable the required access rights.
In [18] the authors expand on these principles and then introduce the concept of
Identity Management as a conceptial tool to think about users’ privacy and security
needs.
4.1.3 Identity Management
A growing body of industrial whitepapers and product descriptions address the isse
of management of customers and employee identities for a business. However, few
of them address the issue from a user’s perspective.
We propose that a conceptual model that views identities not only within the
context of a user’s needs, but also in relationship to other stakeholders in the net-
work is critical for identity management to make any practical impact. Hence we
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introduce a model that takes all these factors into consideration.
4.2 Meanings of Identity
Prior to identifying the stakeholders, we should clarify the meaning of digital iden-
tity, as used in this research. The term “identity” is used in several subtly different
ways. Here are some possible definitions (adapted from [1]):
identity n. pl. identities
1. The collective aspect of the set of characteristics by which a thing
is definitely recognizable or known.
2. The set of behavioural or personal characteristics by which an indi-
vidual is recognizable as a member ofa group.
3. The quality of condition of being the same as something else.
4. The distinct personality of an individual regarded as a persistent
entity; individuality.
Note how some definitions emphazise uniqueness, while others membership of
a group, and yet others sameness.
This ambiguity is present even when discourse is limited to software systems.
Following the lead of [9], the various meanings of the term “identity” in software
and network systems may be classified into several classes.
At first, it would seem that at an individual level, our identities should be owned
and controlled by ourselves. However, in the digital world, is is not as simple.
Depending on what we actually mean by identity, we shall see that the identity
is actually controlled and owned by the user along with every principal the user
interacts with. We find that largely, the various meanings of the term identity may
be put into layers, in order of flexibility and authonomy. Referring to Figure 4.1,
these meaning are:
1. Layer 1. This may be called Physical Identity. This is the person, without the
need for any reference or “handle” to another entity. Attributes of physical
identity are characteristics such as facial features, DNA, fingerprints, retinal
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Figure 4.1: Layers of Identity
patterns: the things associated with a person’s physical existence. These char-
acteristics may be captured as data in a software system and attached to an
identity from a higher layer, and will seldom be used by itself. In other words,
it serves to describe another software entity, and is meaningless in a software
system without reference to a “container” identity. With regards to the con-
taining identity, these data are usually referred to as attributes.
2. Layer 2. This may be called Personal Identity. This is the what humans
refer to as “me”. Some attributes of this identity are: mood, location, pref-
erences, and current status. While these attributes change with time, the sum
total is—from a human perspective—a persistent entity. These characteristics
are seldom captured in traditional software systems. Recently, pervasive, or
human-centric, computing efforts have attempted to capture this information.
Like Physical Identity, these data are meaningless without a referencing “con-
tainer” identity. Unlike Physical Identity, these data are frequently varying,
and partially under the user’s control. Because of these factors, collectively,
they are often referred to as the user’s context. This serves to distinguish them
from attributes, mentioned above.
3. Layer 3. This could be called Relational Identity. This layer contains identi-
ties that are purely or largely implemented in software. These identities are
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assigned to the user by an interacting party and exists as long as a relationship
is maintained. Moreover, it is only partially, if at all, under the user’s control.
It is a software representation of a user’s relationship with the entity owning
or operating the software system. Examples of such identities are: driver’s li-
cense, passport, social security number, telephone number, company network
login accounts, etc. Note here, that there may be various fields on a driver’s li-
cense that emanate from Physical Identities, as we mentioned earlier. A Layer
3 identity can act as a container of Layer 1 identities.
4. Layer 4. This layer may be called a Virtual Identity. It is our modeling con-
truct in order to fulfil some goals, described below. Like Relational Identity,
it is meant to be a software representation of information about a user. Unlike
Relational Identity, it is meant to allow users to control their representations
in software systems almost in the same way as they control their Personal
Identity. It is an approach meant to achieve sometimes conflicting privacy and
security goals of users and businesses. Virtual identities are seldom supported
by business systems.
It is important to note that in the above discussion, Layer 1 and 2 identities are
tradionally not considered as identities in software systems, but may be treated as
attributes of themwhen appropriate. We shall proceed to build our model using only
Layer 3 and 4 identities. But first, we need to clarify why we make the disctinction
between these two layers.
When a service provider and a service consumer execute a contract, the provider
obtains some information about the user and the particular services. They fall into
three categories:
1. Authentication information. This is used so that the user, at the time of obtain-
ing a service, may identify himself to the service provider: “I am so-and-so,
and here is proof that I am who I say I am.” For example, when logging
into an email system, the user would provide a user-id (“I am Robert”), and a
password (“this proves that I am indeed Robert”).
2. Authorization information. This is used by the service provider to determine
if the user is indeed authorized to use the service.
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Only in very simple situations may one assume that a user who is authenti-
cated is automatically authorized to use a service. One such situation is, for
example, when there is a only one service, and is available to authenticated
users all the time.
If the service were available only within a time interval, and this time interval
varied by user, then the service provider would have to determine whether
the authenticated user may access the service at that particualar time. If there
were more that one service, with different users accessing different sets of
services, then again, the service provider would have to determine whether
the authenticated user is allowed to have access to the service he is requesting.
Thus, in general, authorization information is distinct from authentication in-
formation.
3. Accounting Information. For paid services, the service provider would need
to keep track of service usage. Even in flat-fee models, the service provider
may like or be required to have per-user usage statistics. Finally, a bill would
have to be created and sent.
When this information is captured in the business software system of the provider,
effectively, a Layer 3 identity is created. This information is indispensable for the
provider in order to fulfill the contract. We shall refer to this as REGID (for REG-
istration IDentity).
On the other hand, users would like to reveal as little personal information as
possible, when accessing a service, due to security and privacy reasons.
For these purposes, we propose the concept of VIDs (for Virtual IDentities).
A VID may be derived from a REDID by removing some parts and faking other
parts of the information originally specified in the REGID. A VID could be made
persisten if the user wants to use it repeatedly, or it could be generated, used for a
single service serssion, and then discarded.
Figure 4.1 is derived from one described in in [9]. The lowest 3 layers are iden-
tical. In Durand’s model the 4th layer 1 is one inferred from attributes of the lower
layers, thus making it a group vision (“blue eyed citizens”, “light drink lovers”,
”driver’s from Utah”). We conclude that the VID layer (as described in section 4.2)
1The article starts at layer 0, so this would be layer 3 in the article, to be precise.
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was more suitable to the current needs. It is abstracted from the lower one, deriv-
ing another layer of an identity that although used by a person could be completely
unrelated to any of its attributes. Nonetheless it is the identity that a provider sees
when interacting with the user, even if with bogus information. We do not con-
sider the inferred identity as relevant in our framework as a layer. Although it is
part of one’s identity it is not distinct from others and thus not unique. A famous
family therapist said: “The human experience of identity has two elements: a sense
of belonging and a sense of being separate.” We emphasize the “sense of being
separate” in our layers and leave “the sense of belonging” to a recollection of the
identity’s attributes, thus upholding “. . . the individual characteristics by which a
person or thing can be identified” from the dictionary. As discussed below, the
VID layer enables privacy protection to the user as it restricts the knowledge of the
user behind a VID to a single point that does not need to be the service provider.
4.3 Stakeholders and Inter-Relationships
In a software system creating a platform for Beyond-3G networks, there are a large
number of entities, and some terms are used in different contexts with different
meanings, while others refer to the same entitiy. To prevent confusion, we intro-
duce the terms we intend to use and give their definitions for the purposes of this
document.
The objectives of this section are to define some terms related to identity and
their inter-relationships, such that: (a) The terms can be used with the same mean-
ing for discussions of profiles and context; identity and federation; privacy and
confidentiality; and services. (b) The number of such terms is the minimum re-
quired for a coherent discussion. (c) The static inter-relationships are extremely
generic, so as to accommodate different business models. (d) An instantiation of
these relationships can be used by any reasonable scenario.
User. A person that attempts to access a system, whether authorized to do so or not.
If the attempt is allowed, then the person becomes a service consumer. If the
attempt is denied, the person may be an attacker. In our discussion, we assume
strong authentication is always being used, and a successful operation in the
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system emanates from an authenticated user (that is, a service consumer).
The user is a domain concept, and not meant to designate a system entity. But
since it is used very often, we define it here, to clarify that it does not refer to
any system entity. System entities are described below.
Provider. Legal body that provides some benefit to users (in our context, this ben-
efit is a suite of services). This provision is defined in a contract, which is a
legal agreement that is established between a subscriber and a provider.
Subscriber. An entity that executes a contract with a provider, to create an account.
Account. Result of the contract established between a subscriber and provider. It
captures the billing details, list of authorized users, limits on service usage
and service-level agreements, and billing details.
Identity. A common characteristic of Layer 3 and 4 identities discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2. We extend the concept of identity to capture information not only
about users, but also subscribers, providers, and services.
Registration Identity (REGID). It is a container for various user and service re-
lated data, such as userid-password pairs, certificates, and profiles. It is a sys-
tem level object that encapsulates the beneficiary of a specific set of services
form those available in an account. The contents of a REGID are controlled
largely by the subsciber and the provider.
Virtual Identity (VID). It is a user-controlled representation of the user’s attributes
within the system. It contains an identifier along with additional information
like a profile, credentials, usage trace etc. A VID can be regarded as a view
somebody in the system has of the user (more precisely, the REGID). In our
proposal, a REGID can “have” several VIDs, created by the user. The VID
can inherit attributes from the REGID, as well as over-ride them, and allows
the user to introduce new attributes.
Profile. It is s a group of attributes. A profile is associated to only one identity.
Profiles may be private or shared, depending on user-preferences and provider
capabilities, and a particular profile may include other profiles. The profile is
principally a mechanism to group attributes conveniently.
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Figure 4.2: Identity Model as UML diagrams
4.4 Modeling the Relationships
Figure 4.2 shows the relationships as UML diagrams. Here we explain the relation-
ships, and the design decisions behind them in greater detail.
4.4.1 Entities with Identity
Figure 4.2(a) shows that the Provider, Subscriber, REGID and VID objects imple-
ment the interface Identity. An Identity interface guarantees that objects will have
an identifier and some way of proving that they are valid holders of the identifier
(i.e., a credential).
An Identity is an interface that guarantees that these entities have:
1. An Identifier, unique within the scope of the model. Local Identifiers can be
made unique by appending domains. This will be further discussed below.
2. Some credentials to prove claims from entities that they indeed are authorized
holders of a given Identity.
It is clear that REGIDs and VIDs have an Identity.
Providers also have an Identity since they need to authenticate to each other to
validate their trust relationships and set up secure channels. Software agents work-
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ing on behalf of the users need to be able to negotiate with the providers and need
a automated way of verifying the identity of the provider they are conversing with.
The This will be discussed below. This conclusion follows from the requirements
mentioned in 4.1.1.
Subscribers have Identity so that the common authentication infrastructure may
be used to authenticate them, just like REGIDs and VIDs. One may imagine a
subscriber accessing a web-based account management tool. If a subscriber could
be handled like any other user, the same authentication framework could be used
for users and subscribers.
4.4.2 Accounts
Figure 4.2(b) shows that for services to be consumed, an Account—usually backed
by a legal contract—must be set up between a Subscriber and a Provider. A given
subscriber and provider may have more than one account (i.e. a 1:* relationship).
There can be various reasons for this: the subcriber may wish to separate bills
according to some criteria (one bill for services X and Y, another for Z and W).
Within an account, the subscriber may specify: (a) all the REGIDs on whose behalf
he is operating the account; (b) all services he is willing to avail; (c) a mapping from
each REGID to the services it is allowed to used; (d) the limits on these services,
on a per-REGID basis.
Each REGID stands for a user. Some of these REGIDs are created when the
account is created, and others added later to support additional users; REGIDs may
be deleted, too, when the users they represent leave the system permanently.
For e.g., a company may outsource its email system. The company pays for
the system and its maintenance, while the employees of the company use the email
system. Employess would need to authenticate, so that the system may deliver
their individual mailboxes and not reveal one individual’s emails to another. In this
scenario, the company is the subscriber while the employess are users.
In one degenerate case, the subscriber and the provider may be the same entity.
This is the case when a set of services is being run by an organization for its own
employees, for example. Let us call this entity as, simply, the Owner. This entails
that the Owner—Account relationship is also 1:1. Thus the Account object may
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actually be absorbed into the Owner object.
In another degenerate case, the subscriber and user may be the one and the
same. For e.g., when a person opens a paid online email account for his sole use he
both uses the account and pays for it.
As mentioned above, the Account object stores, for each REGID, the set of ser-
vices it is authorized to use. An alternative is that the REGID can store references
to the same set of services. The difference is one of implementation.
4.4.3 Customization and Personalization
Figure 4.2(c) shows how users may customize their apperance to services by deriv-
ing a VID from a REGID. REGIDs contain a set of Profiles. Profiles are groups of
attributes. For example, all attributes related to an email service could be grouped
into an EmailProfile, and all attributes related to a Calendar service could go into a
CalendarProfile. These attributes are repositories of personal and personalizable
information. Attributes common to several services (“color of web-page back-
ground”, for example) can be put in a separate profile and included by other profiles,
as shown bu the includes association.
Figure 4.2(d) shows that a Profile can be designated for and thus refers to a
Service. This reference is indirect, however, which is shown by the contraint remark
within braces.
A VID is a object derived from REGID by copying the Profiles and changing,
removing or adding some attributes.
A trivial example would be: A user is assigned by the Subscriber a REGID x
that comes with an EmailProfile that shows unread emails in red. The user generates
two VIDs, y and z. VID y’s EmailProfile shows unread emails in blue. VIDs z’s
EmailProfile adds a new attribute, that not only highlights unread emails, but also
highlights them differently according to whether they were received within the last
twenty-four hours.
In this way, VIDs are a higher level collection of personalization content. Col-
loquially, they embody a “personality”. The user may change his REGID’s person-
ality by switching VIDs. We shall discuss how this is done below.
A user may create VIDs as and when needed, and either make them persistent
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In this chapter we shall examine how the IdentityModel we created in Chapter 4 can
be used within a network with architecture similar to that explained in Figure 3.1
in Chapter 3, in order to achieve security and privacy goals.
5.1 Federated Operator Scenarios
In general, provider deployments can and will be based on diverse settings.
• Some providers will not have a AAA framework and rely on the Service
Provider’s platform to provide them with the infrastructure for hosting the
sercice; the infrastructure will provide components such as accounting, pol-
icy decision points, policy enforcement points, etc.;
• On the other extreme, there will be providers, likely telco operators, with a
full blown AAA and security infrastructure, where policies are defined and
enforced in their own domain;
• In between there will be operators with partial infrastructures, such as only
accounting servers but not charging mechanisms, with policy enforcement
points but not policy definition and decision points, etc.
These scenarios (in particular the first two) motivate us to use concepts of fed-
eration. Even the all-in-one provider will require federation in order to allow access
to users from other domains.
Federation allows one admnistrative domain to trust another for authentication
and authorization decisions.
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5.1.1 Security Requirements
In a federated infrastructure, such as that shown in Figure 3.1, the following as-
sumptions can be made:
• Domains with their own AAA infrastructures will likely have their own au-
thentication mechanisms;
• Authorization will be distributed; i.e. policies located at different administra-
tive domains may be combined to perform the authorization decision;
• To save the user from the burden of authenticating again and again, at each
provider whose services he is using, Single-Sign-On will be desirable.
On the other hand, from a pervasive networks point of view, the following ad-
ditional assumptions can be made:
• One user may be accessing services at different providers using different iden-
tities;
• Users will initiate multiple sessions on multiple devices, with some devices
simultaneously supporting multiple such users.
5.1.2 Privacy Requirements
We assume that the authentication and authorization protocols are chosen such that
they are robust against passive and active attacks against integrity and confiden-
tiality. This still leaves the user with some privacy concerns. We consider the
following:
1. A user may wish that a passive attacker snooping on the network is unable to
(a) find his “real” identity; (b) correlate different service sessions or invoca-
tions, to build a usage profile.
2. A user may wish to achieve the same privacy levels (a), (b) as above, but
with respect to the service provider whose service he is accessing. He may,
for some reason, want that successive accesses to the same service not be
correlated by the service provider.
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Figure 5.1: ID Managers in MT and SP
Identity Management is enabled by components called ID Managers on the MT
and within the AAA servers of Service Providers. Figure 5.1 illustrates the situa-
tion.
Identity Management works this way:
• Each Home Provider issues REGIDs to its users. There is at least one REGID
per user. A user with two different REGIDs is effectively two different users
as far as the Home Provider is concerned. A REGID is unique in the operator’s
domain.
• For each REGID, a number of VIDs are defined. These VIDs may share all or
none of the REGIDs attributes. The VIDs can be created and deleted at any
time. At least one VID must be present for the system to bootstrap. This VID
could be created at the time of creation of the REGID. The user may later add
more VIDs as he wishes and remove them. by asking the operator (or using a
management interface that the operator may provide for such purposes).
• VIDs have an attribute called Identifier that is globally unique. A VID Iden-
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tifier consists of two parts: (a) the first part is a random alphanumeric string
chosen by the user, that is locally unique to the Home Provider; (b) the second
part is the Home Operator’s globally unique domain name. Combining these
two parts we have an identifier that looks very much like an email address. (In
fact, an email address can be used as VID for our purposes.) From the VID
Identifier, one may find out the Home Provider. However, since the first part
is a string with no correlation to the REGID, it will not be possible to deduce
the user’s identity from the VID alone.
• The VIDs at the AAA ID Manager must be synchronized with the VIDs
present in the MT ID Manager. A protocol like SACRED may be used for
this purpose.1
• Each REGID and VID is associated with a set of credentials issued by the
operator. These credentials could be an RSA key-pair issued by the Home
Provider, where the public key is enclosed in a Certificate signed by the Home
Provider’s CA.
• Services are accessed using a VID’s identifier and credentials.
• Applications installed on the MT “know” only their Service Identifier (SID).
The SID depends on what the application is accessing. For e.g., an email client
may use the SID “XYZ-Email” when accessing the XYZ email service, and
“ABC-Email” when accessing the ABC email service. The exact definition is
left to applications and user.
• The ID Manager on the MT maps the SID to a VID using an internal table.
This table is configured by the user. Every time an application is installed on
the Mobile Terminal, it “registers” itself with the ID Manager, and the user
is offered a chance to configure the mapping to a VID. The user can change
the mapping at any time. In fact, the ID Manager offers an interface whereby
advanced privacy management systems may dynamically alter the VIDs for
an SID, or even invent VIDs for specific uses.2
• The ID Manager delivers the VID to the application requesting. The Applica-
tion then accesses the attributes of the VID to get its credentials.
1This is part of on-going work in the Daidalos project.
2Integration with such systems is part of on-going work in Daidalos.
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• The application may use the credentials in an application specific authentica-
tion mechanism to authenticate the user and secure the session. In case the
application does not have such a protocol, a generic protocol such as SSL,
SASL or IKE may be used to authenticate the user and bootstrap a secure
channel.
• The application talks to a “service”. Typically, the service process will use
a AAA framework to actually process the credentials, rather than using local
information.
• The VID Identifier and credentials are transported, via AAA mechanisms, to
the AAA server of the Home Provider. The AAA server first authenticates
the VIDs credentials. Then it maps the VID to the underlying REGID and
using information from the VIDs profiles, REGIDs profiles and the Account
object, compute an authorization decision. This is then returned, again us-
ing AAA mechanisms, to the service which requested the authentication and
authorization.
In this way, authentication and authorization can be combined with our identity
model to achieve privacy. Note that the user may change VIDs per service at any
desired level of granularity: one VID for all services; one VID per service; or one
VID per service session. The latter, of course, inplies a larger overhead in generat-
ing and synchronizing VIDs. Paranoia, thus, needs to be balanced by performance
considerations. However, the model is quite general and can be applied within ex-
isting application protocols. The applications and services themselves would need
to be modified to be ID Manager “aware” but in most cases could continue to use
their existing protocols.
Notice how the requirements from the discussion above on privacy requirements
are met:
• The user’s real identity is not transmitted over the network and thus an attacker
or the service is unable to determine the user’s real identity.
• In many situations, it is not necessary to determine a user’s exact identity; it
is sufficient to correlate two different sessions, perhaps of different services,
to disrupt privacy. However, by using different VIDs, and/or changing VIDs
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often, the user can prevent such correlation.
5.3 Common Authorization Framework
The research work presented in this section was originally published in [30].
In a federated architecture, it may be assumed that different AAA domains will
use different authentication and authorization mechanisms. Yet, results of authenti-
cation and authorization decisions must be passed from the decision making domain
to federated domains.
For the purposes of transmitting authentication decisions, which are binary in
nature (i.e., Success or Failure), the de facto standard protocol on the Internet is
Diameter [6]. Standards based AAA servers support inter-communication using
Diameter.
However, authorization information is more complex. One may need to com-
municate, for example, that a service has a certain QoS level, rather than merely if
it is available to the requestor.
Within Daidalos, we have chosen to use the Security AssertionMarkup Language
(SAML) [25] for transporting authorization information. SAML standardizes the
exchange of information about the user’s authenticationn status, attributes and au-
thorization decisions. It makes the security infrastructure independent of the spe-
cific mechanisms used for the authentication of users, and also aupports Single-
Sign-On across administrative domains.
When using SAML, a component called SAML Authority is introduced into
the AAA server. It is responsible for generating and parsing SAML messages. It is
also possible, though not necessary, to incorporate the authorization logic into the
SAML Authority, as we have.
We can improve on the mechanism described in the previous section, in the
following manner.
5.3.1 Enabling Single-Sign-On
Enabling Single-Sign-On requires us to decouple the authentication and authoriza-
tion phases. A service no longer uses a user’s credentials to authenticate and autho-
42
CHAPTER 5. ACHIEVING PRIVACY
rize him. Instead, there are two steps.
Authentication Step. This step works much like that described in the previous
section, except that a dedicateed authentication protocol capable of carrying some
extra information is employed (we shall discuss this in greater detail below). For
now we assume that authentication is done between a process on the MT and the
AAA server. As before, the user may choose what VID the should be used by the
process running the authentication protocol on the MT.
When the VID Identifier and its credentials arrive at the AAA server, the AAA
server, as before, authenticates the credentials, and generates the authentication de-
cision. If the authentication was successful (i.e., the decision is Success), it then
invokes the SAML Authority, which uses the VID and REGIDs profiles, and in-
formation in the conceptual Account object, to generate a SAML assertion and
artefact. A SAML artefact is an opaque alphanumeric string uniquely correspond-
ing to the assertion. It has meaning only to the SAML authority, since no other
entity can translate the artefact into the assertion or any other useful information.
The artefact is returned to the MT along with the authentication decision.
Authorization Step. When an application needs to authenticate and authorize
to a service, it takes the artefact delivered in the previous step, and presents its
VID Identifier and the artefact to the service. The service, as before, hands both to
the AAA infrastructure. Via AAA mechanisms, the artefact arrives at the SAML
authority at the Home Provider. The SAML authority uses the artefact to recover
the assertion. It then uses the assertion, VID and REGID profiles, information about
the requesting service, etc. to make the authorization decision. The decision is then
returned as a SAML document to the requesting service.
The advantage of this two-step solution is that any application may use the arte-
fact once it has been obtained during the authentication step. Since authentication
protocols usually require several round trips, while an authorization decision using
the artefact only takes one trip, this saves time. Also, since authentication is done
only once, this seamlessly enables Single-Sign-On.
5.3.2 Protecting the SAML artefact
Sending a plain SAML artefact over the network has some disadvantages:
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1. An attacked may capture an application’s authorization request message (which
contains the artefact) and use it in replay attacks unless the application proto-
col has protection against such attacks;
2. A passive attacker may observe that several service requests were authorized
using the same artefact and conclude that they were initiated by the same
user; this defeats the purpose of using different VIDs for different services (or
service sessions).
3. The same consideration as above applies to the service provider, which can
use the artefact to correlate different service sessions and be able to attribute
them to the same user.
This motivates the introduction of the ID-Token structure. It is a structure safe






























Figure 5.2: ID Token Generation
As shown in Figure 5.2, the ID Token has these main components:
• The VID for which the service request (or authentication request) was initi-
ated.
• A random number, that makes the ID-Token different every time it is gener-
ated from the artefact.
• A serial number (from the Anti-Replay counter), that helps avoid replay at-
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tacks. The serial number is maintained by the ID Managers. The serial num-
ber of an incoming ID-Token must be greater than the last one seen.
• The SAML artefact, itself, which references the appropriate assertion.
• A digital signature computed over the concatenated form of the previous
items.
The ID-Token is used in the manner described below.
Authentication. When the AAA server has authenticated a user during the
authentication step, and received an artefact from the SAML authority, it generates
the ID-Token using the requesting VIDs public key and its own private key, anti-
replay counter and a random number. (In other words, substitute ‘AAA’ for x
and ‘VID’ for y in the figure.) The process of ID-Token generation is shown in
Figure 5.2.
Verification. Figure 5.3 shows the process of ID-Token verification. When the
MT’s ID Manager receives the ID-Token, it uses a process opposite to the genera-
tion process in order to verify the ID-Token and then stores the artefact and updated




























Figure 5.3: ID-Token Verification
Re-generation. When an application wishes to authorize to a service, it re-
quests the MT ID Manager for a VID and an ID-Token. The ID Manager generates
the ID-Token in the same manner as shown in Figure 5.2, using the VIDs private
key for signature and the AAA server’s public key for encryption. (In other words,
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substitute ‘VID’ for x and ‘AAA’ for y in the figure.) Note that it also increments
the Anti-Replay Counter and generates a new Random, before constructing the ID-
Token from the stored artefact.
5.3.3 Revisting Privacy
When an ID-Token, instead of a bald artefact, is transmitted over the network, a
passive attacker sees only a VID, and an opaque, encrypted chunk of data (the
encrypted portion of the ID-Token). Due to the random number component, the
encrypted portion is not going to be the same between two successive authorization
invocations, even if all other material remains the same. Combined with a dynamic
VID, the passive attacker has no way to correlate service usages. The same applies
to the service.
Note that the VID used for authentication and retrival of ID-Token need not be
the same as the VID used for service authorization. The assertion can be recovered
from the artefact alone and remains the same regardless of which VID is used in
the service authorization request.
5.4 A Complete Authentication and Authorization System
In this section, we shall put together the pieces from the previous sections, and
describe a system for flexible authentication and authorization using VIDs and ID-
Tokens for network and application layer services. (This work was presented orig-
inally in [26].)
Obviously, the first network service that is required by a user is basic network
connectivity—the right to send and receive data packets, even with a limited scope,
over the network. Access to this connectivity is granted through a network access
control procedure that depends on the link. Most specifications for this procedure
place it at link layer (e.g. 802.1X port-based authentication [16] for Ethernet or
802.11 links). Recently, a working group has been created at the IETF to develop
a protocol above IP called PANA that will carry authentication messaging indepen-
dently of the underlying link technology.
PANA [13] aims at offering a single authentication method at the IP layer, above
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Figure 5.4: PANA Deployment
different link technologies for multi-access and point-to-point links. PANA defines
how a PANA Client (PaC) authenticates to a PANA Authentication Agent (PAA),
which may rely on an Authentication Server (AS) to perform credentials verifi-
cation. PANA’s design supports various types of deployments; PaC is normally
placed in the user terminal whereas PAA is by definition to be placed a single (IP)
hop away from PaC, typically in a Network Access Server (NAS). For our purposes,
the NAS is the same as the AR. See Figure 5.4.
The PANA protocol runs between the PaC and the PAA and carries an EAP
(Extensible Authentication Protocol [3]) method, using UDP as the transport layer
protocol. In most cases, PANA authentication involves a distant AAA server that
communicates with the PAA using an AAA protocol. PANA access control proce-
dure then fits into a larger AAA-based access control framework. A AAA server
with enhanced Auditing and Charging features, as it is used is Daidalos, is desig-
nated as ““A4C server”.
PANA does not provide traffic confidentiality by itself. Yet, PANA is able to
bootstrap a confidentiality protocol at link (e.g. 802.11i [15]) or IP (e.g. IPsec [20])
layer. See [17], [27] for descriptions of how this may be achived using PANA. In
either case, the secure channel is established between the PaC and the PANA En-
forcement Point (EP), which is dynamically configured by the PAA upon successful
authentication.
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PANA is able to carry information by using Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs); the
base protocol defines the ones required for operation. The protocol supports the
definition of new AVPs to contain new values, this allowing application specific
AVPs. We use this feature to carry authorization information between access net-
works and users (discussed below).
5.4.1 PANA-based Authorization for Network Access
An ID-token is only provided when the user has been successfully authenticated by
an entity trusted by the resource owner. In this case, the resource is network access,
the owner is the AN operator, and the trusted entity is the Home Provier’s AAA
server. When the token is already present at the user’s device, the authentication
phase can be bypassed.
Authentication Phase. In the authentication phase (see Figure 5.5), the ID-
token must be delivered from A4C server to the user’s device in two steps: first A4C
sends the ID-token to AR/PAA after EAP authentication using Diameter; then, the
AR/PAA sends the ID-token to MT using PANA. New defined AVPs for authoriza-
tion are used in both steps to transport the ID-token generated by the A4C server.
First, an ID-token AVP is encapsulated in Diameter EAP application protocol [11]
messages. Then, PANA (specifically PANA-Binding-Request) transports this AVP
to the MT with authorization parameters: ID-token.
Registration Phase. In the registration phase, the user must deliver the ID-
token to the network for obtaining access. A similar procedure as described above
is employed for transporting the ID-token AVP using also PANA and Diameter.
Note, that the PANA messages for the registration phase are different when (a) it is
sent on the PANA session built on the authentication procedure, or (b) it is sent on a
new session. This is related to PANA’s state machine. Figure 5.5 shows an example
where authentication (using EAP-TLS [4]) and registration phase are executed in
the same PANA session.
In this approach, the PAA and PaC must be modified to understand the new
AVPs. This is because the EAP-TLS authentiation method is unable to transport
the ID-Token on its own.
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Ac c e s s  R o u te rMT
MT(P a C ) MT(Q o S  C lie n t) P AA Q o S  E n tity Q o S  Bro ke r A4 C /S AML
P S R (E AP −R e q u e s t/Id e n tity )
D ia m e te r−E AP −An s (E AP −T LS −R e q /S ta r t)
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q(E AP −R e s p o n s e /Id e n tity(VID),C a llin g −S ta tio n −Id   AVP )
P AR (E AP −T LS−R e q/S ta r t)
P AN (E AP −T LS −R e s p /[T LS −C lie n t −H e llo ])
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q (E AP −T LS −R e s p /[T LS −C lie n t −H e llo ])
D ia m e te r−E AP −An s (E AP −T LS−R e q/[T LS −S e rve r−H e llo /C e r tifica te ])
P AR (E AP −T LS−R e q/[T LS −S e rve r−H e llo /C e r t.])
P AN (E AP −T LS−R e s p /[T LS−C e rtifica te ])
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q(E AP −T LS−R e s p /[T LS−C e rtifica te ])
D ia m e te r−E AP −An s (E AP −T LS −R e q(T LS−fin is h e d ) )
P AN (E AP −T LS−R e s p )
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q(E AP −T LS−R e s p )
P BA(MAC −Ad d r  AVP )
{Au th e n tica tio n  + G e n e ra te  
S AML As s e r tio n  & ID −T o ke n }
{Au th e n tica te d }
P D I
Id e n tity Ve r ifica tio n
P AR (E AP −T LS −R e q (T LS −fin is h e d ) )
{R e g is te re d}
D ia m e te r−A3 S −R e q (S AML−R e q u e s t( ID _ to ke n ) )
D ia m e te r−A3 S −An s (S AML−R e s p o n s e (N VU P  As s e r tio n ) )
{N VU P  As s e r tio n  is  p r e s e n t}C O P S  D e cis io n
P U A()
IP S e c  e s ta b lis h m e n t
Acce s s  C o m m it
N e tw o rk Q o s (VID ,ID −to ke n )
P U R (ID _ to ke n −AVP )
P S A(E AP −R e s p o n s e /Id e n tity (VID ))
D ia m e te r−E AP −An s (E AP −S u cce s s ,E AP −MS K −AVP ,ID _ to ke n  AVP ,S e rvice −D a ta−Au th z  AVP )
P BR (E AP −S u cce s s /ID _ to ke n  AVP ,S e rvice −D a ta −Au th z AVP )
C O P S  R e q u e s t(VID ,ID−to ke n )
Figure 5.5: Authentication and Authorization done by PANA
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Ac c e s s  R o u te rMT
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D ia m e te r−E A P −R e s p (P E A P v 2 −R e q/[T LS −S e r ve r −H e llo /C e r tific a te ])
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P A N (P E AP v 2 −R e s p /[T LS −C e r tific a te ])
D ia m e te r −E AP −R e q (P E AP v 2 −R e s p /[T LS −C e r tific a te ])
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e s p ( P E AP v 2 −R e q (T LS −fin is h e d /E AP −S AM L−R e q)
P A N ( P E AP v2 −R e s p {E AP −S AM L−R e s p })
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q( P E A P v2 −R e s p {E AP −S AM L−R e s p })
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e s p( P E AP v 2 −R e q {E AP −S AM L−R e q( ID −to ke n ) })
P A R (P E A P v 2 −R e q{E AP −S AM L−R e q (ID −to ke n )})
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P D I
P B R (E AP −S u c c e s s )
P B A
P AR (P E AP v 2 −R e q ( T LS −fin is h e d /E A P −S AM L−R e q)
TLS  tu n n e l e s ta b lis h e d  (E AP  p a c k e ts  in s ide  P E AP v2  a re  p ro te c te d   ◊  {})
P AN ( P E A P v 2 −R e s p {E AP −S AM L−R e s p ( S u c c e s s ) })
Figure 5.6: Authentication and Authorization done by EAP
5.4.2 EAP-based Authorization for Network Access
As mentioned earlier, using PANA with the EAP-TLS authentication mechanism to
transport the ID-Token requires that the PaC and PAA be modified. We discuss a
second approach that avoids this requirement.
EAP provides a flexible way to authenticate to entities (in particular ad-hoc
nodes) because it supports multiple authentication methods. Some EAP methods
have the capability to carry generic information apart from authentication informa-
tion.
This alternative was demonstrated in [14] which describes how some kinds of
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EAPmethods can carryMobile-IPv6 bootstrapping information toMT during EAP-
based authentication process.
In this approach, we use the PEAPv2 [19] authentication method because it
provides the flexibility needed to achieve our objectives. It allows the definition of
new EAP methods that are encapsulated and carried inside a TLS secure tunnel.
This channel is generated during a TLS handshake in the first phase of the proto-
col. The new EAP method is used to transport the authorization information in the
second phase of PEAPv2. A new method called the EAP-SAML method is used as
a carrier for ID-token assertions and authorization information. There is no need to
invent new AVPs for PANA and Diamteter.
Note that the PANA protocol is used as a lower layer to transport EAP packets
from MT to AR . The authentication sequence and ID-token delivery to MT is
shown in Figure 5.6.
5.4.3 Registration with Existing ID-Token
Figure 5.7 shows the registration process when the user already has an ID-token.
As we can see a new PANA session is executed. The PEAPv2 TLS tunneled phase
2 is used to deliver the ID-token. In this case only the A4C is authenticated by the
MT because the user does not need to be authenticated again as he already owns
the ID-token.
In the second phase, the A4C requests the ID-token from the user by using the
new EAP method (EAP-SAML request/response).
After A4C verifies that the ID-token is correct, it informs the AR/PAA that this
user is authorized to access the network. Then AR/PAA requests the QoS Broker
to obtain quality of service parameters associated to this user and to know if it is
possible to get access. Note that AR has to recover both VID and ID-token to
carry out the registration process. However, it cannot access the EAP messages
because they are encrypted inside a TLS tunnel. Thus, A4C sends both parameters
to AR/PAA by using new Diameter AVPs: VID AVP and ID-token AVP that are
added to Diameter EAP Application.
This approach has a clear advantage: access equipment does not need to be
modified to support this solution because usually they act as simple EAP mes-
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A c c e s s  R o u te rM T
P a C Q o S  C lie n t P AA Q o S  E n tity Q o S  B r o ke r A 4C /S AM L
P S A( E AP −R e s p o n s e /Id e n tity( ID@ d o m a in ) )
P S R ( E AP −R e q u e s t/Id e n tity)
D ia m e te r −E AP −R e s p (P E AP v 2 −R e q/S ta r t)
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q( E AP −R e s p o n s e /Id e n tity( ID @ d o m a in ) )
P AR ( P E AP v 2−R e q /S ta r t)
P AN (P E AP v 2 −R e s p/[T LS −C lie n t −H e llo ])
D ia m e te r −E AP −R e q (P E AP v 2 −R e s p/[T LS −C lie n t−H e llo ])
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e s p (P E AP v 2 −R e q /[T LS −S e r ve r−H e llo /C e r tific a te ])
P AR ( P E AP v 2 −R e q /[T LS −S e r ve r−H e llo /C e r t. ])
P AN ( P E AP v 2 −R e s p )
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q( P E AP v 2 −R e s p )
D ia m e te r −E AP −R e s p (P E AP v 2 −R e q( T LS −fin is h e d /E AP −S AM L−R e q )
P AR ( P E AP v 2 −R e q (T LS −fin is h e d /E AP −S AM L−R e q)
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q( P E AP v 2 −R e s p {E AP −S AM L−R e s p ( VID,ID −to ke n )})
P AN (P E AP v 2 −R e s p {E AP −S AM L−R e s p( S u c c e s s ) })
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e q (P E AP v 2 −R e s p {E AP −S AM L−R e s p (S u c c e s s ) })
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e s p (E AP −S u c c e s s ,E AP −M S K−AVP )
P B A
{R e g is tr a te d }
P D I
VID ,Ar tifa c t
C O P S  R e q u e s t( VID ,ID−to ke n )
D ia m e te r −A3 S −R e q( S AM L−r e q( ID−to ke n ) )
{N VU P  As s e r tio n  is  p r e s e n t }C O P S  D e c is io n
P AR ( P E AP v2 −R e q{E AP −S AM L−R e q( As s e r tio n ) })
{IP S e c  tu n n e l e s ta b lis h e d  IP  a d d r e s s  a va ila b le }
N e tw o r k Q o s( VID , ID−to ke n )
Ac c e s s  C o m m it
D ia m e te r−A 3S −R e s p ( S AM L−R e s p ( N VU P  As s e r tio n ) )
T LS  t u n n e l e s t a b lis h e d  ( E A P  p a c k e t s  in s id e  P E A P v2  a re  p ro t e c t e d )
Id e n tity Ve r ific a tio n
{O n ly A 4 C  Au th e n tic a tio n }
D ia m e te r−E AP −R e s p (P E AP v 2 −R e q{E AP −S AM L−R e q (As s e r tio n )},VID ,ID−to ke n )
P AN ( P E AP v 2−R e s p {E AP −S AM L−R e s p (VID ,ID −to ke n })
P B R (E AP −S u c c e s s )
G e t VID ,ID −to ke n
Figure 5.7: Registration using ID-Token
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sages pass-through. Furthermore, any EAP lower-layer (PANA, IEEE 802.1X) can
be used. Additionally, depending on the EAP method used privacy can also be
achieved. However, normally EAP methods that are able to carry additional in-
formation consume many round trips and it induces performance degradation. On
the contrary, PANA allows a big reduction of roundtrips and the whole process is
very much faster in terms of messages than an EAP based approach. Thus, we are
mandating to use PANA in the MT.
5.4.4 Authorization for Network Depenedent Services
From an operator’s point of view network access control is not sufficient to unlock
access to all specific network-level features. The use of some optional network fea-
tures (designated hereafter as “network-dependent services”) could be conditioned
to certain rights in the user profile (and relevant charging model as well). Also,
some of these network-dependent services may require use of software (e.g. spe-
cific protocol stack) or hardware (e.g. computing power, memory or bandwidth)
resources on some entities in the network. Uncontrolled use of such resources may
easily lead to Denial-of-Service attacks against these entities.
For these reasons, we describe a dedicated authorization phase for accessing
network-dependent services in addition to the initial authentication/authorization
phases.
PANA was historically defined to carry only authentication information, with
binary results (either access to the network is accepted, or it is refused). After
a PANA session had been established between the PaC and the PAA, the only
PANA messages that the PAA could have accepted from the PaC were PANA-
Reauthentication and the PANA-Termination. Yet, some new PANAmessages have
been defined recently (the protocol is still in draft stages and is evolving) that al-
low updating a PANA context in a secure way (taking advantage of the existing
PANA Security Association). These new messages are PANA-Update-Request and
PANA-Update-Answer, and they can be used to carry customized AVPs.
The network-dependent service example we have chosen to depict in this paper
concerns multicast receiver access control. In a nutshell, the problem is the follow-
ing: a multicast group, even if secured through the use of an encryption key, must
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MT Ac c e s s  R ou te r
 : EP : P a C  : P AA  : QoS  Entity  : QoS  Broke r
P UR (ID−toke n_AVP , Mca s tGrpAddr_AVP , Mca s tS rcAddr_AVP , MAC _AVP )
R e que s t(ID−toke n, Mca s tGrpAddr, Mca s tS rcAddr)
C OP S _R e q(ID−toke n_AVP , Mca s tGrpAddr_AVP , Mca s tS rcAddr_AVP )
C OP S _De c(Authr_R e sult , ID_toke n, Mca s tGrpAddr, Mca s tS rcAddr)
De cis ion (Authr_R e sult, ID_toke n, Mca s tGrpAddr, Mca s tS rcAddr)
ID−Toke n is  a u thorize d
S NMP (P a C_De vID, Mca s tGrpAddr, Mca s tS rcAddr)
P UA(Authr_R e sult_AVP , Mca s tGrpAddr_AVP , Mca s tS rcAddr_AVP , MAC _AVP )
Figure 5.8: Multicast Receiver Access Control using PANA
actively control which members subscribe to this group, so that malicious nodes
do not join and launch DoS attacks against their local access network. Hence the
default behavior for an AR (at least in Daidalos) is to silently discard Multicast
Listener Discovery [12] (MLD) Report messages as long as the node wishing to
receive multicast traffic has not been authorized for doing so.
Figure 5.8 shows how PANA and the ID-Token can be used to authorize a autho-
rize the MT to join a multicast group. This method uses a custom AVP to transport
the ID-Token, but this is not a hardship: the PANA-Update-Request and PANA-




The concepts discussed in the previous chapters have been successfully developed
and deployed in the Daidalos testbed. Integration has been achieved to a degree:
it is feasible to run the complete authentication and authorization protocol, using
VIDs, ID-Tokens, and PANA with EAP-TLS and EAP-PEAPv2.
The author was responsible for the implementation of the ID Manager on the
MT. Some design decisions had to be made, and considerable software engineering
had to be done to deliver the implementation in a manner suitable for integration in
a ready-to-demonstrate testbed. We discuss some implementation details below.































Figure 6.1: The ID Manager in the Security Framework
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6.1 The Big Picture
As can be seen, on the MT, the ID Manager is accessed by a number of appli-
cations to get authentication and authorization information, which they present to
services. The authentication client also interacts with the ID Manager, since it is
the ID Manager that actually holds the credentials.
The ID Manager must:
• Allow various applications means to request and receive identity related infor-
mation; some special “management” applications will insert this application
into the IDManager, as well. The interface presented to the applications needs
to be programmatic, rather than interactive. Data stored within the ID Man-
ager needs to be protected against inconsistencies that may be introduced due
to paralllel insertions by different applications.
• Allow the user some basic control over the contents of the ID Manager and
provide an interactive, as opposed to programmatic, interface to inspect the
ID Manager.
• Keep the data safely stored on persistent storage between invocations. The
data is sensitive, so the process must also ensure as far as possible that the
data is not corrupted due to crashes and sudden termination.
• Keep data confidential and authenticate the user prior to releasing the data to
processes launched by the user (the user’s applications and the management
interface).
These requirements led to the decision that the ID Manager should be a daemon
process that is started by an external trigger. It could be started at system boot time
by the init daemon, or be triggered by a script that awaits for the insertion of some
hardware token into the mobile terminal.
6.2 The ID Manager
The ID Manager is implemented in Python. Python provides a high-level, object










































Figure 6.3: ID Manager Process Flow
A file-based representation of an ID Manager’s state is called a KeyStore. The
ID Manager saves its internal state to KeyStores every now and then. We shall see
the usage of KeyStores below.





























Figure 6.4: Initialization Process Flow
Figure 6.4 shows the actions taken by the ID Manager upon startup.
When the ID Manager is launched, it reads a configuration file, which speci-
fies, amongst other things, which KeyStore to use. The user can change KeyStores
between invocations by modifying the configuration file. The user can copy a Key-
Store created and stored on one machine to another machine, invoke the ID Man-
ager there, and expect to have access to all information in the KeyStore. In fact,
this is essential to bootstrapping the system. The user’s Home Provider is expected
to pre-provision the user with at least one VID, which is needed to obtain access
to basic network connectivity. (Once such connectivity has been obtained, the user
may download other VIDs.) This VID and related attributes are supplied as a Key-
Store, which the user may copy into some location on his MT. The user then can
configure the ID Manager to use this KeyStore.
KeyStores contain sensitive information. If the file containing the KeyStore
were to fall in the wrong hands, this information would be compromised. Thus
KeyStores are kept in an encrypted form. A password is used to encrypt the Key-
Stores.
Upon startup, if the ID Manager finds that the KeyStore mentioned in its con-
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figuration file does not exist, it attempts to create it. At this point, it prompts the
user to enter a password. After that, the ID Manager creates a skeletal KeyStore,
encrypts it with the password, and finally stores it on the disk. The password is
cached in the ID Manager’s memory for use in future writes.
On the other hand, upon startup, if the ID Manager finds that the KeyStore
mentioned in the configuration file does exist, it will again prompt the user for a
password, to decrypt the KeyStore. If the decryption is successful, it means the
password is valid (but see 6.2.4), and the ID Manager will proceed to parse the
decrypted data and assemble its internal state.
6.2.2 Processing
The ID Manager daemon is a server that listens and responds to queries over a
unix socket. Clients may connect to this socket, which has a well-defined path, and
invoke operations. Client processes and the ID Manager converse using a query-
response protocol, with one message per query and response.
The IDManager waits until it receives a processing request from a client. When
it does, it validates the query for proper information, formatting, etc. If this stage
fails, it will drop the request. If the request if formatted properly, the ID Manager
will attempt to process the request. It may not always be able to successfully pro-
cess the request. For e.g., if a client asks for an attribute for a particular VID, and
that VID does not exist, then the ID Manager will be unable to supply the client
with the requested attribute. The ID Manager responds to such error situations by
returning a message indicating failure. In other situations, the ID Manager will re-
turn an appropriate response message containing the information requested by the
client. Some requests request the ID Manager to perform an operation rather than
return information. For e.g., a client could ask the ID Manager to delete a VID.
The ID Manager responds to such requests with a message indicating successful
operation.
Whenever there is an operation done by the ID Manager that results in a change
in its internal state, it will synchronize its state to the KeyStore on disk, using the
password to encrypt the information.
Exposing an interface over sockets has the advantage that (a) clients may be
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implemented in any programming language; (b) new messages may be added to the
protocol without invalidating older clients or requiring them to be recompiled; (c)
in future, the ID Manager may switch to a TCP/IP socket and reside on a machine



















Figure 6.5: Processing Loop Process Flow
Figure 6.5 captures the process flow during this stage. We have glossed over
the details of the kinds of requests the ID Manager actually serves.
6.2.3 Cleaning Up
The ID Manager runs until it gets a termination signal. The termination signal is
either the SIGINT or SIGTERM unix signals. The ID Manager intercepts these
signals and goes into the cleanup stage. Doing things this way means that abnormal
conditions (a system shutdown, for example) is also handled in the same manner
as a normal termination and the cleanup stage is always invoked. This ensures that
KeyStores are never left in an inconsistent state.
The cleanup stage does little except to check if the KeyStore needs saving, and
saves it if necessary. Figure 6.6 shows the process flow of this simple stage.
6.2.4 Reading and Writing Key Stores
As mentioned above, the ID Manager is immplemented in Python. Using Python
has the additional benefit that its pickle module can be used to read and write










Figure 6.6: Cleanup Stage Process Flow
easily. The ID Manager employes this module to convert its internal state into a
byte array that is then written to a KeyStore.
When using an existing KeyStore, the byte array is read off the disk and then
converted to the internal object hirarchy, again using pickle. The format of the
binary data in the KeyStore is independent of machines, endian-ness and operating
systems, as long as the pickle module is being used. Luckily, Python is quite
portable.
Actually, the output from the pickling process is first encrypted before writ-
ing to a KeyStore; and the contents of a KeyStore are decrypted before unpickling.
The program openssl is used to encrypt and decrypt the KeyStores. The
cipher used is 3DES in CBC mode. Any other block cipher may be used. As men-
tioned above, a user supplied password is used to encrypt and decrypt KeyStores.
Normally, if a user supplies a wrong password, or an attacker who has got hold
of a KeyStore is trying to guess the password, the decryption routines will fail
completely, signaling that something is wrong.
In rare cases, it is still possible that when a wrong password is supplied by
the user, decryption is successful. The data, however, will likely be gibberish.
Worse, it may be a slightly modified version of the original data. If we were to
use this data, in the best scenario the ID Manager would crash while assembling its
internal state from the data, and in the worst scenario the internal state would be a
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modified version, crafted by an attacker, of the original data. This means we could
compromise the user’s privacy and security.
To prevent even this rare situation from compromising security, the KeyStores
have a header that the ID Manager checks for integrity information after decryp-
tion. If the KeyStore has been modified in any way, or the password is wrong, this
header will not decrypt properly and the ID Manager will then discard the rest of
the data as suspect. The header is a combination of a random string followed by
a checksum over the string, such that the total length of the header is larger than
one cipher block. The random string ensures that when using a chaining mode
such as CBC, the cipher will produce a cipherstream that will look different every
time, preventing an attacker from launching a subsitution attack. The checksum is
the data element that serves to assure that the KeyStore’s integrity has been main-
tained. This header is prepended to the output of pickle before encryption; and
after a successful decryption it is checked and stripped before giving the rest as
input to pickle.
6.3 The Client Library
Notwithstanding the advantages of a socket-based interface, implementing the ID
Manager protocol is quite some work. A lot of messages (there are over thirty at
the moment) need to be encoded and decoded precisely. Programmers of client ap-
plications prefer being presented with an API. For their benefit, a client library has
been implemented that hides the details of managing sockets, and encoding, writ-
ing, reading and decoding messages. Programmers simply call functions, suppying
data to them as arguments, and getting information as results. The function convert
their arguments to an encoded format and then send them over the socket; the func-
tions block on the socket, waiting for the ID Manager’s response; upon receiving
the response message, the functions decode the message and return an appropriate
result value to the caller, including error codes. Thus the library presents client
application authors a vastly simplified interface.
The client library is implemented in C, which makes the library usable to ap-
plications written in C and C++. Most modern programming languages provide
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a mechanism to extend functionality in C. Thus if necessary, the library can be
wrapped in another language. For example, some client applications are written
in Java. A JNI wrapper around the client library is under development to support
those applications.
6.4 Software Development Issues
The ID Manager daemon does some cryptographic operations, particularly those
involving ID-Tokens, that must be programmed in C. Other functions—wrappers
around OpenSSL—already had implementations in C and would be hard to imple-
ment in Python.
Fortunately, Python provides an extension mechanism to implement function-
ality in C and use it from within Python, and this mechanism was used to create a
module creating a Python interface to all functions that need to be implemented in
C or were implemented in C.
The software’s build system (using GNU autoconf and automake tools) is ca-
pable of building a ready-to-install RPM file. The software is distributed as source




In this thesis we described an authentication and authorization framework for se-
curity in a pervasive network, based on work done within an EU research project,
Daidalos. We extracted those aspects of Daidalos that were relevant to our discus-
sion and elaborated on them in Chapter 1. We said that our research goals within
Daidalos were to discover how to:
• Reduce the impact of a growing number of different accounts and services on
the user and make it easier for users to manage their digital avatars.
• Make it easier for providers to roll out services and charge for them.
• Let users discover new services and providers, and use services from providers
with whom they have not had previous experience or an existing business re-
lationhip.
• Let users and providers compose new services on the fly.
Then we asserted that within this thesis we shall concentrate on security and
privacy issues related to the above goals.
7.1 Summary
We proposed that an identity management framework was the right way of thinking
about security and privacy management in pervasive networks. In Chapter 2 we
described prominent identity management frameworks in existence. We identified




• Burden of patents or other intellectual property rights;
• Inability of incorporate multiple authentication mechanisms and protocols;
• No focus on providers’ need to distinguish between a consumer and a sub-
scriber;
• and, no focus on inter-provider trust models.
In Chapter 3 we descibe a subset of components in a pervasive network that are
relevant to security and privacy, to create the context for further discussions.
7.1.1 Identities: Uniform Treatment of Users and Providers
We then proposed our own Identity Model in Chapter 4. As can be seen, most of the
current developments elide particular aspects in our conceptual identity model. The
identities managed in existing specifications are at our 3rd layer (see Figure 4.1)
where some identification of the user is present. The 4th VID layer that we intro-
duce does not exist in present specifications. The current trends are more focused
on providing frameworks for managing the federation aspects than to define an
identity model that correlates to the environment’s needs. Our model tries to bring
identities to a pervasive network, encompassing business semantics related to the
management of the entities in such networks.
We asserted that in our model providers have identity as well as users and sub-
scribers. In the work we have demonstrated, we did not explicitly describe how
provider identities can be used. On the other hand, it is perhaps clear from our
description of the authentication framework that providers may dynamically build
trust between each other using the same means as users build trust between them-
selves and providers. This is made possible due to the introduction of the ID Man-
ager entity into every providers’ network. The ID Manager manages identities and
rights, and these identities (according to our model) can refer to users, subscribers
and providers. In business jargon, we have demonstrated a system that can be used
to build trust relationships in B2C as well as B2B environments.
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7.1.2 Privacy: Federations, Authentication and Authorization
Pervasive environments and their associated networks trigger concerns about pri-
vacy and security of user information. Ease of use, reduction of management
overhead, and enhancement of users’ services require sharing of user information;
users’ need for privacy forbids such sharing. Networks like the one envisioned in
the Daidalos project introduce issues regarding accounting and charging.
We introduce a system of ensuring a truce, enabling a give-and-take approach,
between these conflicting requirements. We have crystallized the user’s manifes-
tation in systems as objects to be managed: namely RegID and VID. We have
given a short overview of where responsibilities lie within this model. Federation,
based on current practices, was incorprated so to allow information sharing between
identities thus enabling innovative, composed and more user friendly services. In
Chapter 5 we showed:
• The kinds of providers that may exist in a federation domain and their differ-
ing needs and capabilities;
• How to use our Identity Model in federations, and how the privacy require-
ments elaborated in the same chapter are achieved;
• A framework for performing authorization using our model and standard tech-
nologies like AAA networks and SAML;
• Some enhancements to the protocols in the above technologies;
• and finally, specification of a complete authentication and authorization pro-
tocols.
7.1.3 Dissemination of Results
The model has been implemented and deployed in a prototype security framework.
It is being used for authentication and authorization within Daidalos and will be part
of the demonstration system for the project’s audit. We describe the implementa-
tion of the ID Manager on the MT in Chapter 6, with process flows and software
engineering issues.
We have published the Common Authorization Framework described in Sec-
tion 5.3 in a paper [26] and a poster in the IST Mobile Summit 2005; We have
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presented the work on PANA/EAP based authorization described in Section 5.4 for
network access in a paper [30] and poster in the same conference.
7.2 Future Work
Work is underway to expand the usage of the Identity Model to context management
in pervasive applications, and to accouting and charging.
The authentication and authorization framework built is being incorporated in
various applications within the project.
In the future, a protocol to actually allow the user to securely create VIDs, and
synchronize them with the Home Provider’s AAA servers, will be specified.
Also underway is work on an automated agent-like system that can understand
security policies of providers and choose/create VIDs for users depending on their
privacy preferences. This will use the profiles in our model to store such prefer-
ences.
We have not mentioned some pre-liminary work done on modeling federation
itself. In fact, the federation model is implicit in the specification of the authentica-
tion and authorization framework. We would like to model this is more detail and
verify the models, to be able to explicitly capture in the system the various possi-
bilities within a federation: how can we model how much is a provider willing to
trust other providers; how does a provider contrain the amount of information that it
reveals about its users, taking into account user preferences, etc. As we mentioned
above, the Identity Model enables users and providers to trade levels of privacy
and ease-of-use, but actually a model of federation is necessary to be able to allow
systems to determine the various trade-off points in an automated manner.
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AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
A4C AAA with Auditing and Charging
AN Access Network
AR Access Router
API Application Programming Interface
CA Certificate Authority
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GSM Global System/Standard for Mobile (Communications)
HA Home Agent
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force (www.ietf.org)
MT Mobile Terminal
NAS Network Access Server
PANA Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access
PaC PANA Client
PAA PANA Authentication Agent
PBNMS Policy Based Network Management System
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
POTS Plain Old Telephone Service
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
REGID Registration Identity
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
TPSP Third Party Service Provider
VID Virtual Identity
WiFi Wireless Fidelity (Chiefly American term used for the IEEE 802.11 suite of
wireless standards and products based on them.)
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
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